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I. Introduction 
 
The essential role of the press in American politics 
has been the subject of extensive study since Alexis de 
Tocqueville wrote that the press “causes political life to 
circulate through all the parts of that vast territory.”1
Tocqueville also wrote about the “necessary connection 
between [political] associations and newspapers,”2 but never 
saw the institutional press emerge as a political 
association – or interest group – in its own right. 
 This article is the very beginning of an exploration 
into the proposition that the institutional press uses the 
litigation process strategically, in much the same way that 
another interest group might lobby the legislative branch, 
to shape its own regulatory environment, particularly the 
First Amendment doctrine within which newsworkers must 
operate.  The purpose of this preliminary work is to 
examine, quantitatively, the degree of participation and 
 
1 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 94 (R.D. Heffner ed., Signet 
Classic 1984)(1835). 
2 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 203 (R.D. Heffner ed., Signet 
Classic 1984 (1840). See also DAVID BICKNELL TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS:
POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION 55 (1951). 
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success by the mainstream media in U.S. Supreme Court 
litigation as parties and amici curiae.   
 Historically, the press had begun to organize itself 
for its own political ends by the early Twentieth Century;3
by the end of that century, the organizations that 
represent the news media were fully engaged in political 
action. In a 1947 case, for example, the Supreme Court 
absolved a journalist of criminal contempt for criticizing 
a Texas county judge, partly on the ground that judicial 
officers are insulated from public opinion.  In a rather 
bitter dissent, Justice Jackson referred to the growing 
power of the press as an interest group: 
 
It is doubtful if the press itself regards judges 
as so insulated from public opinion. In this very 
case the American Newspaper Publishers 
Association filed a brief amicus curiae on the
merits after we granted certiorari. Of course, it 
does not cite a single authority that was not 
available to counsel for the publisher involved, 
and does not tell us a single new fact except 
this one: “This membership embraces  more than 
700 newspaper publishers whose publications 
represent in excess of eighty per cent of the 
total daily and Sunday circulation of newspapers 
published in this country. The Association is 
vitally interested in the issue presented in this 
case, namely, the right of newspapers to publish 
news stories and editorials on cases pending in 
the courts.”4
3 See MICHAEL EMERY & EDWARD EMERY, THE PRESS AND AMERICA 574-581 (6th ed. 1988). 
4 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 397 (1947). 
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Yet the press as player for its own account has hardly 
been studied at all.  One might suggest several 
interrelated reasons for this relative obscurity:  
 1.  The essence of the press’s self-image is public 
service.5 The press does not think of itself, nor does it 
care to be known, as a political actor.  Indeed, such a 
role would strike most working journalists as a conflict of 
interest; how can the press cover political institutions 
with detached objectivity while it seeks favor from those 
same institutions? 
 2.  Accordingly, the press does not generally interact 
with either the executive or legislative branches in the 
same way that other interest groups do.  While media 
organizations are not above lobbying Congress for 
legislation they want – broadcast and cable deregulation, 
copyright protection, favorable postal rates, open meetings 
and records laws, and so on – newsworkers are not 
 
5 The preamble to the Society of Professional Journalists Code of Ethics 
(1996), http://spj.org/ethicscode.asp?, reads as follows: 
 
Members of the Society of Professional Journalists believe 
that public enlightenment is the forerunner of justice and 
the foundation of democracy. The duty of the journalist is 
to further those ends by seeking truth and providing a fair 
and comprehensive account of events and issues. 
Conscientious journalists from all media and specialties 
strive to serve the public with thoroughness and honesty. 
Professional integrity is the cornerstone of a journalist's 
credibility. Members of the Society share a dedication to 
ethical behavior and adopt this code to declare the 
Society's principles and standards of practice. 
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comfortable about it.  “As a general rule,” wrote 
Newsweek’s Jonathan Alter to begin a recent column arguing 
for a federal shield law, “journalists shouldn't be in the 
business of lobbying Congress.”6
3.  By contrast, the press campaigns vigorously in the 
courts for its most important institutional interests. But 
the scholars whom one might expect to monitor their efforts 
are AWOL.  Media law specialists in law and journalism 
schools usually focus on substantive law (outputs), rather 
than political action (inputs), and most political 
scientists who study the courts have apparently been 
distracted by theories that ignore institutional dynamics 
altogether.7
Although the legal literature fully describes the 
efforts of the institutional press to secure various First 
Amendment privileges and other favorable legal rulings 
through litigation,8 there appears to be no systematic study 
of the press from an interest group perspective. Joseph 
 
6 Jonathan Alter, You Shield Us, We’ll Shield You, NEWSWEEK, July 11, 
2005, at 55. 
7 Cornell W. Clayton, Supreme Court and Political Jurisprudence, in 
SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 29-30 (Cornell W. 
Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999). 
8 E.g., Margaret A. Blanchard, The Institutional Press and Its First 
Amendment Privileges, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 225; Steven Helle, The News-
Gathering/Publication Dichotomy and Government Expression, 1982 DUKE 
L.J. 1. 
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Kobylka’s work on obscenity9 comes closest to the approach 
this study takes in theory, method, and substance.  Marc 
Galanter’s concept of “repeat players”10 and various works 
on the effectiveness of amicus briefs11 have also informed 
this study. 
 Perhaps as more “new institutionalists” focus on 
interest groups in the courts,12 the institutional press 
will receive greater scrutiny.  This study offers a modest 
beginning to that process. Part II reviews the interest 
group literature that leads up to this study, while Part 
III substantively examines its theoretical foundation. Part 
IV discusses the methodology used for this study, and Part 
V presents its findings. Part VI offers and brief 
conclusion and some recommendations for further 
exploration. 
 
II.  Literature Review 
 
The notion of interest groups as a political force is 
older than the republic itself.  In Federalist No. 10, 
 
9 Joseph Kobylka, A Court-Created Context for Group Litigation: 
Libertarian Groups and Obscenity, 49 J. OF POLITICS 1061-1078 (1987). 
10 Marc Galanter, Why The “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the 
Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC. REV. 95,97 (1974). 
11 E.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and 
Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109 
(1988); Caldeira & Wright, Amici Curiae Before the Supreme Court: Who 
Participates, When, and How Much?, 52 J. OF POLITICS 782 (1990); Joseph D. 
Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on 
the Supreme Court, 148 U.PENN. L. REV. 743 (2000). 
12 See Clayton & Gillman, supra note 7. 
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Madison warned of the dangers of faction: “a number of 
citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of 
the whole, who are united and actuated by some common 
impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights 
of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate 
interests of the community.” Garson discusses Calhoun’s 
theory of the state as “regard[ing] interests as well as 
numbers, considering the community as made up of different 
and conflicting interests, as far as the government is 
concerned, and takes the sense of each through its 
appropriate organ, and the united sense of all as the sense 
of the entire community.”13 
Tocqueville defines one form of political association 
as consisting “simply in the public assent which a number 
of individuals give to certain doctrines and in the 
engagement which they contract to promote in a certain 
manner the spread of those doctrines.” Suggesting that “the 
right of associating in this fashion almost merges with 
freedom of the press,” he asserts that associations so 
formed are more powerful than the press, attracting more 
like-minded members and increasing in zeal as they do.14 
13 G. David Garson, On the Origins of Interest-Group Theory: A Critique 
of Process, 68 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1505, 1507 (1974). 
14 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1. 
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Modern interest group theory is generally traced to 
Arthur Bentley, whose The Process of Government is credited 
with “developing a theory of government as ‘a process in 
which interest groups are the players and protagonists.’”15 
In fact, Garson cites a number of possibly more deserving 
progenitors, including Bentley’s own teacher, Albion Small, 
whose writings “contain many of the central points of 
interest group theory:  (1) society conceived as composed 
of a large number of groups; (2) no one of which can claim 
to represent the general will; hence (3) the need for 
elections to determine a rough approximation of the 
collective volition; (4) determined by group forces at 
various stages of the political process...”16 
Wherever the credit or blame may lie, the interest 
group theory languished for decades before being 
“resurrected”17 in mid-century by, among others, David 
Truman, whose The Governmental Process: Political Interests 
and Public Opinion provides both “a theoretical framework 
for analyzing group behavior, and the application of  group 
influence in the political process”18 Importantly for our 
 
15 Garson, supra note 13, at 1512 (quoting the editor’s introduction to 
ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT xiii-xix (Peter Odegard, ed., 
1967)). 
16 Garson, supra note 13, at 1511. 
17 Id. at 1514. 
18 Roland Young, Book Review, 278 ANN. AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 200, 201 
(1951). 
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purposes, Truman includes a chapter on the role of groups 
in the judicial process, pointing out that governmental 
choices are “no less important to interest groups when they 
are announced from the bench than when they are made in 
legislative halls and executive chambers.”19 Truman points 
out that group interests are “particularly close to the 
surface” when constitutional questions are resolved,20 which 
characterizes the great majority of cases involving the 
media.   
 Like Truman, Martin Shapiro sees the Supreme Court as 
something of a protector for groups who may be under-
represented in the legislative or executive branches, 
either because they are still inchoate as interest groups 
or because they have lost their political battle in those 
arenas.21,22 Shapiro’s major work on the freedom of speech 
and the First Amendment, however, barely mentions the 
institutional press in either category; indeed, the 
relatively heavy use of the Court by the media might be 
seen as an example of a third category of “clientele”: 
groups that are institutionally unsuited to lobbying the 
political branches. Twenty years later, however, Shapiro 
 
19 TRUMAN, supra note 2, at 480. 
20 Id. at 494. 
21 Id. at 487. 
22 MARTIN SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 36-37 
(1966). 
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had no difficulty analyzing the Supreme Court’s 
constitutional libel doctrine in terms of government 
regulation of an industry – the press.23 
Finally, Galanter’s distinction between “haves” and 
“have nots”24 among litigating parties provides an 
interesting theoretical perspective for considering the 
success of the institutional press as it has for a number 
of studies of court outcomes.25 Media companies and 
associations are obviously “repeat players” by Galanter’s 
standards, and their opponents run the gamut from the 
federal government to private individuals claiming libel or 
invasion of privacy.   
 
III. Theory 
 
Interest group theory rejects the presumption that 
government tries to advance the public interest, and rather 
asserts with Madison that “all participants in the 
political process act to further their self-interest.”26 
While the institutional press most assuredly sees its self-
interest as co-extensive with the public interest, at least 
 
23 Martin Shapiro, Symposium: New Perspectives in the Law of Defamation: 
Regulatory Analysis, 74 CAL. L. REV. 883 (1986). 
24 Galanter, supra note 10. 
25 Herbert M. Kritzer, Martin Shapiro: Anticipating the New 
Institutionalism, in THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 433 (N. Maveety ed., 
2003). See also IN LITIGATION: DO THE “HAVES” STILL COME OUT AHEAD? (Herbert M. 
Kritzer & Susan S. Silbey eds., 2003). 
26 E.R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive 
Judicial Review? 101 YALE L.J. 31, 35 (1991). 
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with respect to First Amendment issues, that hardly negates 
the application of the theory to this multibillion-dollar 
enterprise.  The theory, moreover, sees government 
regulation as a commodity, to be “purchased” by interest 
groups who stand to benefit from favorable regulatory 
terms,27 typically by expending resources on lobbying, 
campaign contributions and, presumably, litigating. 
 As informed by Galanter’s “repeat player” concept, 
interest group theory would predict that the media would be 
highly successful in influencing the courts to “regulate” 
favorably.  The press is readily recognizable as an 
interest group “which has had and anticipates repeated 
litigation, which has low stakes in the adjudication of any 
one case, and which has the resources to pursue its long-
run interests.”28 The press certainly has “ready access to 
specialists,” given the experience and prestige of the 
media defense bar, and, for the most part, the press is 
free to choose whether or not to seek review of an adverse 
decision in the lower courts. Accordingly, we would expect 
“a body of ‘precedent’ cases – that is, cases capable of 
 
27 Id.
28 Galanter, supra note 10, at 98. 
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influencing the outcome of future cases – to be relatively 
skewed toward those favorable” to the press.29 
Indeed, Loffredo points out that the Court has 
“displayed exceptional sensitivity toward elite 
communicative modes,” including, “to a lesser extent, the 
prerogatives of the mass media.”30 Overall, however, the 
legal literature suggests that, although the media have 
been remarkably successful in doctrinal areas involving 
content regulation – notably prior restraint, libel, and 
privacy cases – it has not fared as well in newsgathering 
cases, including such issues as access to government 
records and invocation of testimonial privilege. That is 
what this study was expected to show, and it does.  
 Blanchard attributes this apparent anomaly to the 
Court’s refusal to extend any special privilege to the 
institutional press that is not available to the general 
public, a posture deriving from the historic idea that the 
press is merely an extension of speech.31 Alternatively, 
Helle argues that the answer lies in the struggle between 
 
29 Id. at 98-102. 
30 Howard Gillman, Reconnecting the Modern Court to the Historical 
Evolution of Capitalism, in THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: NEW 
INSTITUTIONALIST INTERPRETATIONS 251 (Howard Gillman ed., 1999) (citing Mark 
Graber, The Clintonification of American Law: Abortion, Welfare, and 
Liberal Constitutional Theory, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 804 (1997) (quoting 
Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy, and Constitutional Law, 141 
U.PENN. L. REV. 1277, 1364 (1993))). 
31 Blanchard, supra note 8, at 226. 
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the press and the government for, respectively, access to 
and control of information.32 Helle’s reading of the cases 
appears to be most compatible with interest group theory, 
with the government in these cases acting as an offsetting 
interest group.33 This study might shed a little light on 
each of these hypotheses. 
 The overall success of the press in these cases would 
also seem to comport with findings that “amicus briefs 
filed by institutional litigants and by experienced lawyers 
… are generally more successful than are briefs filed by 
irregular litigants and less experienced lawyers,”34 
although the authors “cautiously” interpret their findings 
as more supportive of what they call the “legal model” of 
judicial decision-making than the interest group model.  Of 
the three models they considered – legal, attitudinal, and 
interest group – only the legal model would favor “filers 
who have a better idea of what kind of information is 
useful to the Court”; the interest group model, as they 
conceive it, would give the edge to the side that generates 
the greater number of briefs, regardless of the quality of 
 
32 Helle, supra note 8, at 1. 
33 Herbert M. Kritzer, The Government Gorilla: Why Does Government Come 
Out Ahead in Appellate Courts?, in IN LITIGATION, supra note 25. 
34 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 11, at 750. 
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the information.35 This hypothesis, too, is testable to 
some extent in this study. 
 Still, the primary purpose of this study was exploring 
the cases, rather than testing hypotheses, raising 
questions rather than producing answers.  Perhaps it has 
accomplished a little of both.      
 
IV. Methodology 
 
In discussing external pressures and the Court’s 
agenda, Charles Epp points out that the American Civil 
Liberties Union’s support for constitutional litigation 
“profoundly affected the Supreme Court’s agenda” between 
1917 and the early 1930s.36 He notes that the ACLU “offered 
to sponsor appeals in Near v. Minnesota,37 but a wealthy 
publisher stepped in and took over financing.”38 That 
wealthy publisher was none other than Col. Robert R. 
McCormick of the Chicago Tribune, who then headed the 
Committee on Freedom of the Press of the American Newspaper 
Publishers Association,39 which he dragged kicking and 
screaming all the way to Washington on Near’s behalf. 
 
35 Id. 
36 Charles Epp, External Pressure and the Supreme Court’s Agenda, in 
SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING, supra note 7, at 266. 
37 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
38 Epp, supra note 36, at 267. 
39 FRED W. FRIENDLY, MINNESOTA RAG 79 (1981). 
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Near v. Minnesota became the first important instance 
of interest group litigation by the institutional press to 
reach the U.S. Supreme Court, but it is only one of 100 
Supreme Court cases in which the mainstream, institutional 
press played a direct role as party or amicus (see Appendix 
A). These cases, which comprise the database used in this 
study, were selected by examining every case that appeared 
in Congressional Quarterly’s CQ Supreme Court Collection, 
Cases-in-Context: Speech, Press, and Assembly,40 
supplemented by the tables of cases in two leading media 
law texts.41 
The first step in constructing the database was to 
identify participation in the case by mass circulation news 
media – primarily newspapers, magazines, broadcast outlets, 
and cable television services – as well as their corporate 
owners and associations formed by those corporations and 
the principal actors within them.  Where such actors were 
parties to the litigation, such as New York Times v. 
Sullivan,42 the cases were automatically included.  
Otherwise, both LEXIS and Westlaw databases were consulted 
to determine whether mainstream media actors filed or 
signed onto amicus briefs.   
 
40 Supreme Court Collection, http://library.cqpress.com/ssc. 
41 MARC A. FRANKLIN, ET AL., MASS MEDIA LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (6th ed., 2000), 
and DWIGHT L. TEETER & BILL LOVING, LAW OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS (11th ed., 2004). 
42 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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Cases in which the only media actors could not fairly 
be described as “mainstream” or “institutional,” such as 
the World War I sedition cases or most obscenity cases, are 
excluded from the database. Some very important media law 
cases, such as Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,43 were excluded 
under this criterion. Also excluded are cases in which the 
press appears as both plaintiff and defendant, particularly 
copyright and unfair competition cases.  And where 
different cases were consolidated into a single opinion, 
they were generally treated as separate cases for purposes 
of this study.   
 Among the media players that feature prominently in 
this study are the New York Times, The Washington Post, the 
Chicago Tribune, and a few other active newspapers; Time 
Magazine and occasionally a few other magazines; broadcast 
television networks, including ABC, NBC, CBS, and PBS; and 
cable outlets such as Turner Broadcasting (also part of 
Time-Warner).  Organizational players include ANPA (and its 
successor Newspaper Association of America), American 
Society of Newspaper Editors, Associated Press Managing 
Editors, National Association of Broadcasters, Radio-
Television News Directors Association, and Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press (see Table 7).  Although 
 
43 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
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civil liberties groups such as the America Civil Liberties 
Union often represent similar positions in media-related 
litigation, they are not the primary focus of this article. 
 Once the cases were selected, they were divided into 
three categories: cases involving content regulation (prior 
restraint, libel, privacy, etc.), cases involving 
newsgathering (access to records, open courtrooms, 
testimonial privilege, etc.), and cases involving simple 
business regulation (tax, antitrust, subscription sales, 
etc.).  For each case, the principal opponent of the 
media’s position was classified, using a variation on 
Galanter’s scheme, as the federal government, other 
governmental entities, other “repeat players,” and “one-
shotters.”   
 Other independent variables include whether the media 
actor was a party, an amicus, or both; how many amicus 
briefs were filed on each side of the case; and which of 
the leading media actors participated in the each case.  
The outcome of the case, whether the press won or lost, is 
treated as the dependent variable for most calculations.  
 
V.  Findings 
 Overall, the press has been successful more often than 
not, although by a relatively small margin.  Of the 100 
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cases analyzed, the press won 53 and lost 47.  However, the 
press has been considerably more successful in dealing with 
content-regulation cases than with newsgathering cases.  Of 
the 70 content regulation cases, the press won 43 and lost 
27, while in the 24 newsgathering cases, the press won only 
6 and lost 18.  This certainly comports with the findings 
of Blanchard and Helle, although, alone, it says nothing 
about the reasons why this would be true.44 
Table 1 – Outcome by Type of Case 
 
Won   Lost   Total 
 
Content Regulation 43 61.4% 27 38.6% 70 70% 
Newsgathering   6 25.0% 18 75.0% 24 24% 
Business Regulation  4 66.7%  2 33.3%  6  6%  
 
Total   53 53.0% 47 47.0%    100  100% 
 
Chi square= 10.000,  2 df,  p = .007
As noted above, some member of the institutional press 
was either a party to the litigation, participated as a 
friend of the court, or both, in all 100 cases analyzed.  
The press was significantly more successful when it was a 
named party, winning 43 or 56.6% of the 76 cases in which 
it was a named party, compared to only 10 or 41.7% of the 
24 cases in which the press was represented only through 
amicus briefs.   
 
44 See supra text accompanying notes 31-33. 
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It did not seem to matter at all whether the press as 
party litigant was supported by additional press amici or 
not, although it was more common for press party litigants 
to have press amici support than not. While this in no way 
detracts from Kearney and Merrill’s findings on the 
importance of amicus briefs,45 it does suggest some 
advantage to party status for which amicus briefs cannot 
compensate.   
 
Table 2 – Outcome by Party Status of Press 
 
Won    Lost   Total 
 
Party+Amici 25 56.8%  19 43.2% 44 100% 
Party Only 18 56.3%  14 43.7% 32 100% 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Total Party 43 56.6%  33 43.4% 76 76% 
Amicus Only 10 41.7%  14 58.3% 24 24% 
 
Total  53 53.0%  47 47.0%    100 100% 
 
Chi square = 6.339, 1 df, p = .012 
 
The media were also far more successful as petitioner 
than as respondent, winning 38 of 54 cases or 70.4% as 
petitioner, compared to 10 out of 36 cases or 27.8% as 
respondent, probably for reasons having less to do with 
characteristics of the press than with the theory that the 
Supreme Court is more likely to review decisions it wishes 
 
45 See supra text accompanying notes 34-35. 
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to reverse.46 That notion finds some support in the fact 
that, in the 10 cases that reached the Court on direct 
appeal from a district court, the press won 5 of 7 cases as 
appellee and lost all 3 cases as appellant.  In other 
words, the Court affirmed 8 of 10 cases on direct appeal 
when it did not have the discretion to deny certiorari. 
 
Table 3 – Outcome by Press as Petitioner/Respondent 
 
Won    Lost   Total 
 
Petitioner 38 70.4%  16 29.6% 54 100% 
Respondent 10 27.8%  26 72.2% 36 100% 
 
Total  48 100%   42 100%  90 100% 
 
Chi square = 15.744, 1 df, p = .000 
 
Much has been written about the American Civil 
Liberties Union as amicus,47 and its presence in cases 
involving the institutional press certainly appears to have 
affected the outcome. The press significantly improved its 
winning percentage when the ACLU lined up on the same side, 
winning 75.8% of the time. Moreover the press lost 5 of the 
6 cases in which the ACLU argued against the press 
position. 
 
46 H.W. PERRY, DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
280 (1991). 
47 See Epp, supra note 36; SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A
HISTORY OF THE ACLU (1990). 
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Table 4 – Outcome by ACLU Participation 
 
ACLU Position Won   Lost   Total 
 
Pro Press  25 75.8% 8 24.2% 33 84.6% 
Anti Press  1 16.7% 5 83.3%  6 15.4% 
 
Total  26 66.7%    13 33.3% 39 100% 
 
Chi square = 7.977, 1 df, p = .005 
 
Looking at the opposition, the press did much better 
against state and local agencies, including trial courts, 
winning 23 of 34 cases or 67.6%, than against the federal 
government, winning only 8 of 24 or 33.3%.  This certainly 
comports with Kritzer’s findings that the federal 
government is, indeed, the proverbial 800-pound gorilla, 
but it does not reflect the considerably smaller advantage 
he attributes to state and local government entities.  The 
explanation may lie in the “linkage” Kritzer found between 
the success rate of state and local government entities and 
the resources of their opponents.48 
Even most state attorneys general do not command the 
legal talent that the institutional press can assemble. The 
lawyers mobilized on behalf of the press, such as Floyd 
Abrams, James Goodale, Jane Kirtley, Bruce Sanford, Lee 
Levine, and others, comprise a literal “Who’s Who” of the 
 
48 Kritzer, supra note 33. 
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media law bar.  The press faced only a half-dozen non-
governmental “repeat players” and won 4 of the cases. 
 
Table 5 – Outcome by Type of Opponent 
 
Won   Lost   Total 
 
Federal Government 8 33.3% 16 66.7% 24 24% 
Other Government   23 67.6% 11 32.4% 34 34% 
Other Repeaters 4   66.7%  2 33.3%  6  6%  
One-Shotters     18 50.0% 18 50.0%     36   36% 
 
Totals      53 53.0% 47 47.0%    100  100% 
 
Chi square = 7.235, 3 df, p = .065 
 
Perhaps the greatest surprise was the finding that the 
institutional press only broke even against 36 so-called 
“one-shotters” that it faced in Court.  This flies in the 
face of all the variations on the Galanter theme. Looking 
more closely at the individual cases, however, suggests two 
possible explanations. One explanation involves the four 
newsgathering cases,49 where the losing record is easily 
understood in light of the discussion above.   
 
49 The cases were Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (cameras in 
courtrooms); Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (broken promise 
of confidentiality); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1998) and Hanlon v. 
Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (1998) (police ride-alongs ). 
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The second is more complicated.  The press won 11 
libel cases against one-shotters and lost 11, won 3 privacy 
cases and lost 2, won 2 prior restraint cases and lost 1, 
won 2 other content-related cases and lost all 4 
newsgathering cases. Most of the libel cases were decided 
after 1964 when the Court revolutionized libel law in New 
York Times v. Sullivan. Nearly all of the cases that 
followed made important doctrinal refinements to answer 
constitutional questions raised by the Sullivan 
prescription: what is “actual malice”? who is a “public 
figure”? etc.  
 Thus, one suspects these cases, which account for 22 
of the 36 one-shot cases, were accepted and resolved almost 
without regard to the litigants as the Court wrestled with 
very technical questions of pure law.  Two of the non-libel 
cases, which sounded in privacy and intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, could also be explained as 
refinements of the Sullivan doctrine. 
 Yet another unexpected finding from this study was the 
relatively little difference in press case outcomes among 
the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts – the only Courts 
with enough press cases for comparison – despite the marked 
conservative trend from 1953 to 2005. Indeed, the press was 
most successful in the Rehnquist Court, winning 16 of 29 
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cases or 55.2%, and least successful in the Burger Court, 
before which the press won 26 of 51 cases or 51%.  
 
Table 6 – Outcome by Court (Chief Justice) 
 
Won   Lost   Total 
 
Fuller       0     2     2 
White   0     1     1 
Hughes   2     0     2 
Stone   2     0     2 
Vinson   1     1     2 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Warren   6 54.5%   5 45.5%  11 100% 
Burger  26 51.0%  25 49.0%  51 100% 
Rehnquist  16 55.2%  13 44.8%  29 100% 
 
The study also found that amicus briefs submitted by 
the press or urging the same position taken by the press 
more than doubled the number of amicus briefs taking the 
opposing position, 267 to 118.  Of the major press 
participants, the Newspaper Association of America 
(formerly the American Newspaper Publishers Association) 
was the most active, with 35 amicus briefs submitted or 
signed, followed closely by the Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Press, with 30 briefs and three appearances 
as named party.  
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Table 7 lists the 16 leading press participants. 
Table 7 – Leading Press Participants 
 
Participant      As Party As Amicus 
 
Newspaper Association of America/ANPA 0  35 
Reporters Comm. for Freedom/Press  3  30 
American Society of Newspaper Editors 0  28 
Radio Television News Directors Assn. 2  22 
National Association of Broadcasters 0  24 
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS)  5  17 
National Broadcasting Company (NBC) 3  19 
Society of Prof. Journalists/SDX  0  21 
New York Times      2  18 
Chicago Tribune     1  18 
Washington Post     3  15 
Los Angeles Times     1  15 
National Newspaper Association  0  13 
Magazine Publishers Association  0  11 
Associated Press, AP Managing Editors 0  11 
Time, Inc.      4          5 
 
VI.  Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Study 
 
This study has only scratched the surface of what 
promises to be a goldmine of information that is as deep as 
it is wide. Vertically, the study should be expanded to 
include certiorari decisions, as well as decided cases, and 
federal and state courts at every level.  Horizontally, 
further study might compare pure speech and non-mainstream 
press cases to see how the results might vary in the 
absence of a coherent interest group.  More work is needed 
to explain why individuals do so much better against the 
institutional press than theory would predict. 
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But there can be little doubt that the institutional 
press is an interest group to be reckoned with in the 
Supreme Court, its aversion to such a designation 
notwithstanding.  Over the past century, and especially 
since 1964, the press has secured for itself the greatest 
legal protection available anywhere in the world. And while 
some of that protection has come from Congress, by far the 
greatest share has come from the Supreme Court’s expansive 
interpretation of the First Amendment’s Press Clause.   
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